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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 16-4442 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
  
ANGEL CATALINO IVOSTRAZA-TORRES, 
 
        Appellant 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-16-cr-00138-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 16, 2017 
 
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 17, 2017) 
 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge 
 
Appellant Angel Catalino Ivostraza-Torres seeks resentencing on account of an 
inadvertent error in the form outlining his conditions of supervised release.  Because 
Ivostraza-Torres provides no plausible reason why alteration of the erroneous supervised 
release condition would affect his sentence in any way, full resentencing is not warranted, 
but we will remand for the limited purpose of allowing the District Court to correct the 
form condition of supervised release.  
I.  Background 
 Ivostraza-Torres, 54, conspired to smuggle narcotics from Puerto Rico to 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania by way of the United States Postal Service.  The scheme, 
which involved the shipping of nearly one kilogram of cocaine within an Epson printer, 
came to an end when postal authorities discovered the cocaine, replaced it with a sham 
substance, and apprehended Ivostraza-Torres once the package was delivered in 
Philadelphia.  In August 2016, Ivostraza-Torres pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, 
to an information that charged him with one count of possession with intent to distribute 
500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and that categorized 
Ivostraza-Torres as a career offender based on his four prior cocaine-related convictions.  
See 21 U.S.C. § 851.1   
                                              
1 While Ivostraza-Torres argues that his career offender designation was 
inconsistent with then-existing Department of Justice policy, his argument appears 
baseless and would not, in any event, state a cognizable claim.  United States v. Wilson, 
413 F.3d 382, 389 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Department of Justice guidelines and policies do not 
create enforceable rights for criminal defendants”).  
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Ivostraza-Torres’ sentencing hearing was held in December 2016.  As a career 
offender, he faced a mandatory minimum of 120 months and a minimum term of 
supervised release of eight years.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).  The career-offender 
enhancement also elevated his Guideline range to 262-327 months.  Ivostraza-Torres 
requested a variance because more than ten years had elapsed since his last conviction 
and because three of his four prior convictions were for very small quantities of cocaine.  
He also argued that at the “advanced age” of 54, Appellant’s Br. 21, a Guidelines-range 
sentence would keep him in prison into his seventies.  The Government opposed the 
variance and requested a Guidelines sentence.   
 After properly considering the Guidelines, the factors specified in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553, and Ivostraza-Torres’ request for a variance, the District Court imposed a 
sentence of 204 months’ imprisonment followed by eight years of supervised release.  As 
for the conditions of that release, the District Court stated:  “While on supervised release, 
these standard conditions apply: He can’t possess any illegal drugs or firearms.  Credit 
reporting and DNA—credit reporting and drug testing is up to the discretion of the 
probation department.”  App. 69-70.  It also filed, along with the judgment, the 
customary form from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (“AO”) that 
lists thirteen standard conditions of supervised release.  Standard Condition 4 of that form 
provided that the defendant will “support his or her dependents and meet other family 
responsibilities.”  App. 5. 
On appeal, Ivostraza-Torres challenges the imposition of Standard Condition 4 on 
the grounds that, about a month before his sentencing, the AO had updated the customary 
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form to remove that condition, and because the Seventh Circuit recently held that, to the 
extent the prior form required the defendant to “meet other family responsibilities,” it was 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.  See United States v. Guidry, 817 F.3d 997, 1009 
(7th Cir.), cert denied, 137 S. Ct. 156 (2016).2  As a result, Ivostraza-Torres argues that 
his sentence should be vacated entirely and “the matter remanded to permit the district 
court to consider shortening the length of imprisonment so as to fashion a meaningful 
financial support condition.”  Appellant’s Br. 4.  The Government agrees that remand is 
necessary, but only for the limited purpose of removing that language.  
For the reasons outlined below, we agree with the Government.  
II.  Discussion 
 In reviewing conditions of supervised release, we review the reasonableness of a 
condition against the § 3553(a) sentencing factors and allow “sentencing judge[s] . . . 
wide discretion in imposing terms of supervised release.”  United States v. Albertson, 645 
F.3d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 2011).  If an erroneous condition is imposed, this Court may direct 
a full resentencing, or may remand for a more limited purpose, “as the court considers 
appropriate.”  18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1).  We have directed district courts to conduct 
resentencings de novo when an interdependent count of an aggregate sentence is vacated 
or when the vacation of a count affects the “total offense level, Guideline range, or 
sentence” itself.  United States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705, 735 (3d Cir. 2013).  In cases 
involving the erroneous imposition of conditions of supervised release, however, we 
                                              
2 The Guidelines Manual now lists conditions regarding “support of dependents” 
as special conditions rather than standard ones.  U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d) (amended 
November 1, 2016). 
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typically have remanded with instructions for the district court merely to eliminate or 
reformulate the conditions.  See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 188 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 Here, because the Government “concedes that the condition that the defendant 
‘meet other family responsibilities’ is impermissibly vague, and that the [D]istrict [C]ourt 
erred in using the superseded form,” Gov’t Br. 15., the only dispute concerns the scope of 
remand.  We easily conclude, however, that only a limited remand is warranted.   
As a threshold matter, Ivostraza-Torres does not meet the standard under 
Ciavarella, 716 F.3d at 734-35, for de novo resentencing.  Nothing in the record indicates 
that any part of Ivostraza-Torres’ sentence was based on erroneous factfinding, and he 
pleaded guilty to and was sentenced on a single count, so no interdependent counts 
potentially alter his sentence.   
 Ivostraza-Torres’ three arguments for a full remand also are unpersuasive.  First, 
while he contends we should remand for resentencing on account of the “interplay 
between prison time and the term of supervised release,” Albertson, 645 F.3d at 198, 
unlike in Albertson the term of supervised release is not at issue on appeal; the District 
Court imposed the mandatory minimum of eight years, and there is ample evidence that 
in granting Ivostraza-Torres’ motion for variance, the District Court adequately 
considered the § 3353(a) factors, including Ivostraza-Torres’ “advanced age,” his large 
number of relatives, and the minor nature of some of his earlier crimes.  App. 54-66; 68.  
Second, although we reject Ivostraza-Torres’ invitation to apply the Seventh Circuit’s 
standard, which would call for resentencing when reconsideration of a condition of 
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supervised release “may conceivably induce” the judge to “alter the prison sentence that 
he imposed,” United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 382 (7th Cir. 2015), Ivostraza-
Torres provides no valid reason why the District Court here would conceivably be 
induced to alter his sentence.  Third, it is not our Court’s practice to look to the “cross-
cutting” effects between the conditions of supervised release and the length of 
imprisonment, as Ivostraza-Torres urges us to do in view of United States v. Anglin, 846 
F.3d 954, 971 (7th Cir. 2017), vacated on other grounds, No. 16-9411, 2017 WL 
2378833 (U.S. October 2, 2017).  And in any event, Ivostraza-Torres fails to recognize 
that the Anglin Court ordered a limited remand to clarify supervised release conditions, 
not a full resentencing.  Id. at 972.  
In sum, Ivostraza-Torres’ only valid claim of error is the inadvertent inclusion of 
impermissible language in a standard condition of supervised release, the alteration of 
which will not affect his offense level, his Guideline range, or the remainder of his 
sentence in any way.  Because de novo resentencing is not warranted, we will remand to 
the District Court for the limited purpose of deleting the “meet other family 
responsibilities” language from Standard Condition 4.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will remand to the District Court for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.     
